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INCENTIVES
James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj

Abstract: Incentives are a major part of what defines the “economics” part in experimental
economics. We discuss experimental approaches to addressing confounds that can arise with
incentive payments to experimental subjects. They include choice of salient payoff levels to
insure dominance, experience to promote understanding, alternative institutional formats to vary
accessibility of payoff information, and lottery payoffs to induce risk neutrality. We examine
issues that arise with response mode effects and game form misconception. Choice of which
instruments to use and when to use them is part of the art of experimental design that should be
informed by the research questions of interest and the type of confounds that are expected in a
given environment and economic institution. One confound that is frequently not addressed in
the literature is use of payoff protocols that are not incentive compatible. We call attention to this
issue.
Keywords: experiments, methodology, incentives
JEL Classification Code: C90

This is a draft chapter. The final version is available in Handbook of Research Methods and
Applications in Experimental Economics, edited by Arthur Schram and Aljaž Ule, published in
2018/2019 by Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
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INCENTIVES
James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj1
1. INTRODUCTION
Incentives are a major part of what defines the “economics” part in experimental economics. A
“salient” incentive payment varies with the outcomes in an experiment that result from actions by
the subjects (Wilde 1981).2 A participation fee that does not vary with subjects’ actions is not
salient. Economic experiments commonly, but not always, use monetary incentives.3 Since salient
monetary incentives vary with outcomes that result from subjects’ actions, they provide motivation
to subjects not satiated in money (Smith 1976) for undertaking actions within an experiment.
Smith (1976) identifies three complications (or “qualifications”) that can confound control
in an experiment: (1) subjective cost, (2) interpersonal utilities, and (3) value of playing the game.4
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and Smith (1976) stress the importance of: (4) complete vs. incomplete
information. We add: (5) response mode effects (Grether and Plott 1979, Cox and Grether 1996);
and (6) game-form misconception (Plott and Zeiler 2005, Cason and Plott 2014).
In following sections, we provide examples of how such complications interact with
experimental methods in several topic areas of research. The discussion will focus on experimental
approaches to control for confounds. The choice of the salient payoff level (dominance of the
reward, Wilde 1981) is used as an important instrument to offset subjective costs. Other
instruments include: withholding information on others’ payoffs (privacy, Wilde 1981) to inhibit
triggering interpersonal preferences (when they are not being studied); practice rounds or
repetition to promote understanding; alternative institutional formats (e.g. game trees and price
clocks) to vary accessibility of payoff information; and binary lottery payoffs to incentivize risk
neutrality (when it is being assumed). We discuss how salient payoffs can interact with

Andreas Ortmann, an anonymous reviewer, and an editor provided helpful comments and suggestions on a
preliminary draft of this chapter. We thank the National Science Foundation (grant number SES-1658743) for research
funding.
2
Saliency, dominance, and privacy are among the precepts discussed by Smith (1982a), who attributes these three to
Louis Wilde. For scholarly accuracy we follow Smith and cite Wilde (1981). (The correct year of publication and
edited book title for Wilde’s seminal chapter are included below in our References.)
3
Paying money to subjects can, potentially, lead to self-selection by participants more strongly motivated by financial
compensation. Such possible selection may or may not be a problem depending on the research question addressed in
an experiment. One topic area in which this type of subject self-selection could be a concern is in experiments on
eliciting social preferences. Falk et al. (2014) report little selection effect in a social preferences experiment.
4
See also Siegel (1961) and Fouraker and Siegel (1963). In today’s terminology, “interpersonal utilities” would be
labeled other-regarding preferences or social preferences.
1
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experimental task repetition and economic institutions to affect subjects’ behavior. The last section
discusses problems with the common practice of experimentalists using payoff protocols in
experiments with more than one decision that are not incentive compatible for eliciting true
preferences within each decision.
In discussing incentives, it is natural to view the experimenter as a principal and the
subjects as agents. The experimenter controls the set of available actions and the mapping from
actions to outcomes, and wants the subject to choose her most preferred action assuming she
completely understands the environment and institution and has zero subjective cost from
experimental task completion. We call this the Experimental Decision Problem.
One difficulty is that the experimental tasks given to subjects may be unfamiliar to them,
and it may require effort to understand the tasks and the implications of alternative actions. If the
subject incurs a subjective cost from experimental task completion then her choice will be the most
preferred given her subjective effort cost, which may confound interpretation of the data because
such cost is not observable.5 We call this the Subject’s Decision Problem. In this way the existence
of subjective cost creates a moral hazard problem the experimenter needs to address. One way to
better align the incentives of the subjects and experimenter is through dominant salient rewards
that compensate for subjective cost by increasing the opportunity cost of actions that are
suboptimal for the Experimental Decision Problem.
If a lazy or distracted subject does not understand the experimental environment or
institution then providing larger payoffs may motivate effort leading to better understanding. 6 In
addition, scaled-up payoffs can reduce decision errors from random choices from among actions
with trivial economic consequences. In contrast, larger payoffs may not improve quality of data if
a subject believes she understands the experimental environment and institution but is mistaken.
If there is “failure of game form recognition” (Cason and Plott 2014) then scaled-up payoffs may
not be helpful but providing subjects with opportunities for learning may produce data that more
accurately reflect the subject’s preferences.7 This issue is discussed below (in section 8). Paying
subjects real salient payoffs, by itself, does not correct for response mode effects such as preference
Smith, 1976; see also Camerer and Hogarth, 1999.
See Ariely et al. (2009) for discussion of the boundaries of the effectiveness of this approach.
7
There is some evidence that eliciting beliefs about play by others can elicit choices more consistent with theoretical
predictions (e.g., Croson 2000 finds that it promotes defection and free riding) but eliciting beliefs can cause crosstask contamination from hedging. Space limitations prevent us from discussing these issues. For a survey on belief
elicitation, see Schlag, et al. (2015).
5
6

3

reversals (Grether and Plott 1979).8 In contrast, the preference reversal phenomenon is not robust
to repetitive decisions in markets with large salient payoffs (Cox and Grether 1996).9
In many-decision experiments, a subject who does understand the experimental
environment and institution will be motivated to provide biased data (that is, make choices that do
not reflect her true preferences at the single decision level) if the experimenter uses a mapping
from multiple choices to payoffs – a payoff protocol or payoff mechanism – that is not incentive
compatible.10 Use of incentive incompatible payoff protocols is widespread in the literature, most
especially in experiments on decisions under risk, but also in many other topic areas (Cox et al.
2015). This issue is discussed in section 9.
We next present an historically important example that illustrates use of induced valuation
to create controlled supply and demand in markets. The experimenter’s objective is to learn about
the efficiency properties of market institutions. The induced supply and demand schedules make
efficiency of market allocations unambiguously measurable by researchers.
2. INDUCED VALUATION IN LABORATORY MARKET EXPERIMENTS
In a laboratory market experiment a researcher assigns values to a buyer for each unit of an abstract
commodity that the buyer can buy, Vj , for j = 1, 2, ... n:
(1)

V1 > V2 > V3 > … > Vn

Similarly, costs are assigned to a seller for each unit that the seller can sell, Ci , for i = 1, 2, ... m:
(2)

C1 < C2 < C3 < … < Cm

This provides an example of the experimental method called induced valuation (Smith 1976).
These values and costs are ordinarily the private information of buyers and sellers.

A preference reversal occurs when a subject chooses lottery a over lottery b but places a higher selling price on the
latter.
9
Evidence on the effect of salient payoffs on choices is mixed (Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann,
2001). Camerer and Hogarth (1999) covers 74 studies: 22 studies report a positive effect of incentives on mean
performance, 28 studies find no effect, and 9 studies report negative effects. Hertwig and Ortmann (2003) find that
positive effects are mainly observed in “judgments and decisions” studies whereas evidence on “no effects” comes
from studies of “games and markets”. Smith and Walker (1993) report that larger monetary incentives decrease
variance of responses.
10
In the case of a multi-decision experiment, we say that a payoff protocol is not incentive compatible if it provides
incentive for a subject with true preference for option a over option b to choose (…,b,…) over (…,a,…) when that
choice is embedded as one of many and payoffs are generated with the protocol.
8
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Salient incentives for exchange are created by an experimenter’s credible promise to pay
subjects as follows. If a buyer with value Vk exchanges a single unit with a seller with cost Cj at
the price P then the experimenter pays them the monetary amounts:

(3)

Buyer: Vk – P
Seller: P - Cj

So long as the subjects prefer more money to less, and transaction costs are negligible, the
experimenter’s credible promise to pay subjects the monetary amounts given by (3) provides
incentives to buyers and sellers to search for better deals and induces on buyers and sellers the
demand and supply prices given by statements (1) and (2).
Assume a researcher hopes to learn about the efficiency properties of a market institution
by conducting an experiment with controlled demand and supply functions created with induced
valuation.11 One important market institution that reduces transaction and search costs by
centralizing information on bids and asks is the double auction used on most stock exchanges.12
A robust finding is that laboratory double auction allocations (of abstract commodities) are highly
efficient, with efficiencies close to 100 percent within a few repetitions (Smith 1982a, 1982b).
A stress test of the robustness of high efficiency of the double auction is provided by a
boundary experimental design in which all values are equal to V and all costs are equal to C, with
V > C, but there are more units on one side of the market (Smith 1976, 1982a). With this design,
at competitive equilibrium all gains from exchange go to the short side of the market. With
privately induced demand and supply schedules, high efficiencies in double auction markets are
robust to this boundary experiment, at least when small “commissions” are paid to overcome
transaction costs. Making the values and costs public information, however, impedes convergence
in this boundary experiment, which seems to reflect the effects of interpersonal utilities. This
The observable maximum possible gain from exchange Gmax is given by the area between the market demand and
supply functions created by induced valuation. The observable realized gain from exchange Gobs is given by the total
amount of money paid to the experimental subjects following the rules given by statements (3). The measure of
efficiency of exchange is E = 100 × Gobs/Gmax.
12
The permissible actions, pricing and contracting rules for a simplified version of the double auction institution in
which each exchange is a single unit (but buyers and sellers can make multiple exchanges in a market period) are as
follows (Smith 1982a):
A. Any buyer can: (1) make a bid to buy a unit at a stated price or (2) accept an outstanding offer price, which
makes a market price, and effects an exchange of a unit;
B. Any seller can: (1) make an offer to sell a unit at a stated price or (2) accept an outstanding bid price, which
makes a market price and effects an exchange of a unit.
11
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illustrates one reason experimental researchers usually implement induced values and costs as
private information in order to inhibit possible effects of interpersonal utilities on exchange.13
3. INTERPERSONAL UTILITIES AND INFORMATION
Duopoly Games. Fouraker and Siegel (1963) conducted several experiments on duopoly (and
triopoly) designed to study the effect of information about others’ payoffs on decisions. They argue
that predictions of models that assume simple own-payoff-maximizing agents are more likely to
be observed in the absence of information on payoffs of other players. Complete information about
payoffs offers opportunities for interpersonal comparisons, which leads to higher dispersion of
outcomes as more instances of cooperative or competitive strategies are elicited. Fouraker and
Siegel identify three types of subjects (or strategies): simple maximizers (own payoff), rivalrous
competitors (own minus other’s payoff), and cooperators (own plus other’s payoff).
To investigate whether interpersonal preferences were the source of the diversity of the
data in the complete information treatment, Fouraker and Siegel used incentives (in the form of
bonuses) to induce cooperative or rivalrous behavior. To induce cooperation, any pair of subjects
with total payoff exceeding a certain level of profit received an additional bonus. To induce rivalry,
within each pair of subjects the subject with the larger profit received a bonus. Subjects participated
in ten practice rounds with feedback before they played one real monetary payoff round. Their
data provide support for the validity of: (i) Cournot solution in the Incomplete Information
treatment; (ii) Cooperative solution in Induced Cooperation treatment; and (iii) Competitive
solution in Induced Rivalry treatment. An alternative approach, often used these days, is to first
classify subjects according to their types and then use that information to predict (or explain)
behavior in the game of interest. This approach was rejected by Fouraker and Siegel on two
grounds: (1) “…. a priori preference for the experimental rather than the psychometric approach”
(Fouraker and Siegel 1963, p. 155), and (ii) absence of a reliable method for type classification of
subjects.
Centipede Games. Several studies of play in centipede games14 offer examples of use of the
experimental approach to address issues with interpersonal utilities and subjective costs. Suppose
the research question is identifying conditions that accelerate breakdown of a joint enterprise that
Outside the laboratory, the producer or consumer surplus realized in a market exchange is ordinarily private
information.
14
The game was introduced by Rosenthal (1981) to challenge common knowledge of rationality.
13
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can be modeled as a centipede game. One might expect the play of the game to be affected by
efficiency (e.g., exponentially increasing centipede games), when total payoffs increase as the
game continues, as well as by asymmetry of the distribution of the total payoff (e.g., competitive
centipede games).
Krockow et al. (2016) provide a survey of experimental studies of centipede games from
1992 to 2016 covering 72 treatments. Play in competitive centipede game experiments reported by
Fey et al. (1996) and Cox and James (2012) is closest to complete unraveling to a take at the first
opportunity.
To control for efficiency considerations, Fey et al. (1996) study play in a constant-sum
centipede game, in which “not quitting” never increases total payoff to all players. The unique
outcome of Nash equilibrium (with selfish, fair or efficiency preferences) of this game is quitting
at the very first node. They find that in the 6-node and 10-node games, after the fifth match the
average exit rates at the initial node are 0.70 and 0.53.15 In comparison, the exit rates in the first
five matches are 0.46 (6-node game) and 0.37 (10-node game). These figures highlight the
importance of providing subjects with opportunities for learning about the structure of the game
and the play of others by repeatedly playing the game.
The experiment reported by Cox and James (2012) preserves efficiency but: (i) induces
rivalry by allocating all gains to the quitter; (ii) discourages “never quit” with zero end-node
payoffs (Aumann 1992) and (iii) uses private payoff information. Two institutional formats, tree
and clock, are used to study play of their exponential, zero end-node-payoff centipede game (see
Figures 1-3 in Cox and James 2012).16 The clock format needs more cognitive effort to appreciate
efficiencies lost by quitting at early nodes as it requires a mental picture of the future payoffs; such
payoffs are visually explicit in the tree. Within a couple of matches, complete unraveling of play
is observed in simultaneous move games as well as in sequential move games with clock format
(see Figures 6 and 7 in Cox and James 2012).17 A slower convergence to complete unraveling is
observed in the tree format with simultaneous moves.

The maximum payoff in the game is $2.92. Subjects participated in nine to ten matches with randomly matched
opponents.
16
The tree format is an extensive form game tree that provides payoff information for all decision nodes in the game.
The clock format, conventionally used in Dutch auctions, provides payoff information only for the currently-active
decision node.
17
The maximum payoff in the game is $20. Subjects participated in ten matches after three practice rounds.
15
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Two studies that use payoff level as an instrument in their experimental approach are
Rapoport et al. (2003) and Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009). Rapoport et al. (2003) conduct threeplayer, zero end-node-payoff centipede games with exponentially increasing payoffs, vary the
scale of payoffs, and provide abundant opportunities for behavior to stabilize.18 In the high-payoff
experiment, in the last fifteen matches 72 percent of exits were observed at the initial node. In the
regular-payoff experiment only 2.6 percent of exits were at node 1. They conclude that increasing:
(i) payoff level, (ii) number of players, and (iii) number of matches accelerate unraveling. PalaciosHuerta and Volij (2009) use both experienced (chess player) and regular (student) subjects in play
of an exponentially increasing centipede game with payoffs ten-times the ones used in the first
study of centipede game by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). When chess masters play each other in
the field experiment with only one match, more than 73 percent of the exits are at the initial node.
In the laboratory, after the fifth match, when chess masters play each other the exit rate at the initial
node is 100 percent but down to 60 percent when chess masters play students.19 Despite the high
payoff levels, data from students playing students are similar to the ones observed by McKelvey
and Palfrey.20 Palacios-Huerta and Volij argue against social preferences and favor own rationality
and belief in others’ rationality as accounting for play in perfect information games.
4. INTERPERSONAL UTILITIES AND EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS
The standard ultimatum bargaining game (UBG) models a one-time interaction between two
agents, one proposing an allocation ((1-r)S, rS) of a certain amount of money, S and the other given
the power to veto implementation of the proposal. The standard dictator game (DG) takes the veto
power away from the non-proposer. Because there are no strategic considerations in the DG, the
game has been a favorite tool in measuring interpersonal utilities.
Nash equilibrium is of little help for modeling play in UBG because it can support any
outcome ((1-r)S, rS) but subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten 1961) makes sharper predictions.21

18

The maximum payoffs used in the high-stakes and regular-stakes treatments in Rapoport et al. (2003) were $2,560
and $25.6. Subjects participated in 60 matches.
19
Caution is needed in interpreting this result because Levitt, et al. (2011) did not find that play by chess masters
unraveled in their centipede game experiment. They did find many chess masters backward induct in their Race to
100 game.
20
See also Smith (2010, page 5-8) for a discussion on backward induction and its empirical validity being regularly
challenged by data.
21
Subgame perfect equilibrium is theoretically one of the most embraced solution concepts of games with perfect
information.
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Starting with Güth et al. (1982), play in UBG turned out to be a difficult problem for induced
valuation in the laboratory, setting the stage for an extensive research program pushing the idea
that interpersonal utilities should be incorporated into players’ utilities of outcomes to make proper
inferences from the data. As discussed above, the early approach (Smith 1976) to control for
interdependencies was through privacy (i.e., no information on others’ payoffs). The usefulness of
this approach, however, is limited when the research question is empirical validity of a solution
concept, which usually requires knowledge of payoffs of others.
There have been numerous studies of play in UBG with differing payoff scales. 22 In a
survey of 37 studies of UBG, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) find that: (i) shares are around 40 percent
and decrease in amount available to share (S), and (ii) rejection rates about 16 percent. In a recent
study motivated by reports of insensitivity of responder behavior to payoff scale.23 Andersen et al.
(2011) attribute the insensitivity to scarcity of offers below 20 percent. They find support for the
use of very large payoff levels on decreasing rejections.24 Unfortunately, as they do not have a
dictator game to compare distributions of offers in DG and UBG it remains open whether their
data from the treatment with the largest payoff scale support subgame perfect equilibrium.
Rather than interpersonal utilities, Hoffman et al. (1994) explores several hypotheses about
effects of experimental protocols on play. The instruments used by Hoffman et al. to control for
confounds include: neutral wording, exchange framing, contest role assignment, and double blind
payoff protocol to control for experimenter “audience” effect.25 Lower offers and higher
acceptance rates were observed with contest entitlements, double blind payoffs and exchange
framing.26

For surveys see Oosterbeek et al. (2004) and Karagozoglu and Urban (2016); for a meta-study of UBG see Tisserand
(2014).
23
Cited examples include Slonim and Roth (1998), Cameron (1999), and Munier and Zaharia (2002).
24
Average (aggregated) rejection rates across their four payoff levels were: 36 percent, 43 percent, 28 percent and 4
percent. The dollar equivalents of the rupee payoffs {20, 200, 2000, 20000} were {$0.41, $4.1, $41, $410}. Daily
average wage in India was 100 rupees.
25
In a double anonymous (or “double blind”) payoff protocol subjects’ actions are anonymous to everyone, including
the experimenter. It is possible to pay the subjects salient rewards from an experiment but preserve their anonymity
by the following procedure. Have each subject choose one from among N identical-looking sealed envelopes. Each
envelope contains a uniquely numbered key. Subjects are instructed to keep their key numbers private but enter them
in their computers or paper response forms. At the end of the experiment, a subject uses the key to open, in private, a
numbered mailbox containing salient rewards from their participation in the experiment.
26
In $10 games, the percentage of offers greater than or equal to $4 were 45 percent (contest and exchange) and 85
percent (random role assignment and “divide $10” wording).
22
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In the same spirit, Stahl and Haruvy (2008) argue that behavior in UBG reflects unintended
induced social context by the verbal description of the game. They implemented UBG with a game
tree representation in addition to a standard verbal description of the game. Observed play was
similar to other studies of UBG in the verbal representation but close to SPE with selfish
preferences in the tree representation.27 Stahl and Haruvy used both conventional bargaining over
shares of the pie as well as bargaining over probabilities of receiving the whole pie (in binary
lotteries). They find no effect on proposers or responders from this use of binary lottery payoffs.
Binary lotteries have been proposed as an instrument for inducing risk neutrality, an issue that we
take up in section 6.
While many researchers (Hoffman et al. 1994, Stahl and Haruvy 2008, Smith 2010) take
the position that what appears as “interpersonal utility” may reflect arbitrary role assignments,
social norms triggered by the presence of audience (experimenter) effects, or suggestive
description of the decision task, others (Kahneman et al.1986, Bolton 1991, Rabin 1993) have
shifted towards inclusion of interpersonal utilities in the Experimental Decision Problem. This
initiated an explosive research program on assessing interpersonal utilities via experiments with
the dictator game (DG).28
The generosity of subjects’ choices, however, can depend on the protocol used to assign
endowments in an experiment. This has been clearly established in experiments on DG that
compare data from treatments in which subjects earn their endowments rather than having them
randomly assigned by the experimenter. Cherry et al. (2002) had subjects, who would subsequently
make decisions in a dictator game, first earn their endowments by answering questions from the
Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT). Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), in addition, had
recipients earn money by answering GMAT/GRE questions.29 Allocations to the recipients were
largest when recipients earned money and least when dictators earned money. Combining
endowments earned by dictators with a double blind payoff protocol has very striking results: in
In the tree-representation 69 percent of proposers chose the most selfish available offer and 96 percent of responders
accepted the offer. In the verbal representation, these figures were down to 23 percent and 49 percent.
28
This research program has taken on a life of its own: Google Scholar returns more than 60,000 results for “dictator
games”. A seminal paper in this literature is by Andreoni and Miller (2002) who vary the price of giving and dictator’s
endowment to test whether observed dictators’ choices satisfy GARP (i.e., whether dictators’ choices are
rationalizable by convex preferences). They rule in favor of rationalizability, a conclusion that has been challenged
by some later studies (Bardsley 2008, List 2007, Lazear et al. 2012, Cappelen et al. 2013).
29
In Cherry et al (2002) subjects answering 10 or more questions correctly received $40 endowments; others received
$10 endowments. In Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), subjects who performed the earning task were assigned CAN$10,
CAN$20 and CAN$40 if the total number of correct answers were fewer than 9, between 9 and 14, or exceeding 15.
27

10

Cherry et al. (2002), 97 percent of the $40 dollar earners allocated $0 to the paired recipient
whereas the zero gift figure in Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) was 100 percent of dictators. In Oxoby
and Spraggon’s receiver earning treatment, 63 percent of dictators’ offers exceeded 50 percent of
the money for recipients who earned CAN$40 while no dictators made such offers in the (no earned
endowments) baseline. Differences in generosity stemming from earned vs. unearned endowments
are also reported by others (e.g., Ruffle 1998, List 2007).
5. FOCAL POINTS: SCALE AND ASYMMETRY OF PAYOFFS
In a seminal paper, Schelling (1957) explores principles that underlie negotiations and bargaining
(tacit or explicit) when communication is not possible. Focal points emerging in tacit (common or
divergent interest) coordination games are thoroughly examined through a series of ingeniously
constructed scenarios. Here we focus on common interest and divergent interest coordination
games and the effect of scale of payoffs on the efficacy of focal points for reducing coordination
failure.
The two games differ only with respect to the symmetry of payoffs when coordination is
successful. With an action set of only two alternatives, say A and B, choosing differently is worth
nothing. In the game with common interest, coordination on either action is valued the same

( i ( A, A) =  i ( B, B), i = a, b) , whereas in the divergent-interest case game players have favored
actions:  a ( A, A)   a ( B, B) and  b ( B, B)   b ( A, A) . The experimenter can induce these
rankings by offering to pay the same positive payment in the common-interest game only when
both players choose the same action. In the divergent-interest game, positive payments are again
offered only when both players choose the same action but player a’s payment is larger if the
coordination is on action A whereas player b’s payment is larger if the coordination is on action B.
In the common-interest game, there are only two payoffs so we can interpret payoffs as von
Neumann-Morgenstern (N-M) utilities. In contrast, in the divergent-interest game there are more
than two distinct payoffs so we can only interpret induced payoffs as N-M utilities with the
subsidiary hypothesis that the subjects are risk neutral.
Parravano and Pulsen (2015) study the effect of payoff scale on play in these two games.30

In the symmetric coordination game, payoffs (in British Pounds) are: (0.5, 0.5) in Low, (5, 5) in Medium and (15,
15) in High. In the asymmetric coordination game, payoffs are: (0.5, 0.6) in Low, (5, 6) in Medium and (15, 18) in
High.
30
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If payoffs are indeed N-M utilities, then larger stakes through positive affine transformations of
payoffs should have no effect on equilibrium play. But in the presence of decision costs, larger
stakes may facilitate coordination by increasing the opportunity cost of not coordinating. In all
cases, choosing different actions results in earnings of 0 for both players. However, the opportunity
cost to each player of non-coordination is 30 (resp. 10) times as much in the High (resp. Medium)
treatment than in the Low treatment. Authors find higher average coordination rates with High
stakes than Low stakes but no difference between Medium stakes and Low stakes in the commoninterest coordination game. Play in the divergent-interest game is not affected by the stakes. The
authors argue that neither mixed strategies, nor Level-k reasoning, nor team reasoning can explain
the pay effect on their data.
These data illustrate that if the opportunity cost of an inferior action is non-negligible and
interdependent preferences are aligned with selfish ones (by design in the common-interest
coordination game) then scaled-up payoff may be successful in promoting use of focal points
(labeled salience here31) as coordination devices.
6. BINARY LOTTERY PAYOFFS FOR CONTROLLING CURVATURE OF UTILITIES
Consider an experiment in which subject j will be paid the amount of money  ( x j , X − j ) if he
chooses some action x j and other agents choose the vector of actions X − j . If the experimenter is
testing the implications of a risk neutral theory, he is interested in subject j addressing the
Experimental Decision Problem:
(4)

max   ( x j , X − j ) f (X − j )dX − j
xj

where f ( X − j ) represents risk neutral agent j’s belief that other risk neutral agents will choose the
vector of actions X − j . Let agent j be an expected utility (EU) maximizer and her preferences over
money be represented by some increasing nonlinear function u () . Then agent j has the Subject’s
Decision Problem:
(5)

31

max  u ( ( x j , X − j )) g (X − j )dX − j
xj

See also Crawford et al. (2008).
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where g ( X − j ) represents EU agent j’s belief that other EU agents will choose the vector of
actions X − j .
How could the experimenter incentivize agent j to take up the Experimental Decision
Problem? Binary lottery payoffs were introduced to the theoretical literature by Smith (1961) and
to experimental methods by Roth and Malouf (1979). Let P denote the maximum possible payoff
available to agent j in the game. Now, instead of paying the subject the amount of money

 ( x j , X − j ) for action profile ( x j , X − j ) assign the agent prizes A > B (  0) with probabilities
 ( x j , X − j ) / P and 1 −  ( x j , X − j ) / P . Without any loss of generality, set u(A)=1 and u(B)=0 and
verify that by the axioms of expected utility theory (EU) the Subject’s Decision Problem would
become
(6)

max
xj

1
 ( x j , X − j ) f (X − j )dX − j
P

which is the same as the Experimental Decision Problem.
Let’s assume, for the discussion in this paragraph, that lottery payoffs are efficacious for
controlling curvature of utility of payoffs in experiments. And consider for clarity of example that
a researcher is testing a theoretical model that incorporates an assumption of linearity in payoffs
(along with all of the other assumptions in the model). Then would an experimenter want to pay
subjects with binary lottery payoffs rather than ordinary monetary payoffs? It depends on the
experimenter’s choice of research question. If a researcher wants to learn whether risk-neutralized
subjects behave in ways consistent with the risk neutral model’s predictions then use of lottery
payoffs would be warranted. But that might not be the researcher’s question. The researcher may
want to learn how well a model predicts the behavior of subjects with whatever risk attitudes and
other uncontrolled characteristics they may have. Unless the intended domain of application of the
model is limited to one in which all agents are known to be risk neutral, use of efficacious lottery
payoffs might produce misleading conclusions about usefulness of the model in predicting
behavior.32

Whether or not a researcher “should” use lottery payoffs for experiments testing risk neutral models has been
disputed in an historical controversy: see Cox et al. (1992) and Kagel and Roth (1992).
32
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If we drop the assumption that lottery payoffs are known to be efficacious in inducing
linearity in payoffs then questions about using them become more complicated. Papers reporting
results from testing efficacy of lottery payoffs have produced conflicting conclusions.33
7. RESPONSE MODE EFFECTS CONFOUNDING INDUCED VALUATION
Suppose that an experimenter wants to elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. The literature on the
preference reversal phenomenon provides an example in which use of induced valuation by the
experimenter can systematically elicit different risk preferences from the subjects when the
response mode is switched from choice to valuation. This literature also contains a clear example
of how salient payoffs can interact with task repetition and economic institution to remove the
response mode effect on elicited risk preferences.
The choice objects in preference reversal experiments are typically binary lotteries.
Lotteries or “bets” are presented in pairs containing a probability bet and a money bet with similar
expected values. The probability bet has a relatively high probability of a relatively low win state
payoff. The money bet has a relatively low probability of a relatively high win state payoff. The
experiments involve eliciting preferences with both the choice response mode and the valuation
response mode. Valuations are elicited for minimum selling prices with an incentive compatible
revelation mechanism such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. If the choice
and valuation response modes elicit the same preferences then, for any pair of lotteries, the money
bet should have a higher selling price than the probability bet if and only if the money bet is chosen.
The “preference reversal phenomenon” (PRP) is that the probability bet is frequently chosen when
the money bet has a higher selling price.
Research on the PRP originated in psychology and was brought into economics by Grether
and Plott (1979). Their paper examines several reasons why the earlier results reported in
psychology experiments might not have implications for economics. One of these reasons was use
of hypothetical payoffs in the earlier literature.34 Grether and Plott’s treatments included use of
hypothetical payoffs and (what were at the time) large monetary payoffs. They found (to their

See, for examples: Berg et al. (1986), Walker et al. (1990), Rietz (1993), Cox and Oaxaca (1995), Berg et al. (2008),
Stahl and Haruvy (2008), Harrison et al. (2013).
34
One important exception to use of hypothetical payoffs was the experiment run on the floor of a Las Vegas casino
by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973).
33
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surprise) that incidence of preference reversals was somewhat higher in the monetary payoff
treatments than in the otherwise identical hypothetical payoff experiments.
The central question addressed in the paper by Cox and Grether (1996) is whether the PRP
is robust to repetitions in markets. They used the traditional BDM mechanism to elicit selling
prices in non-market treatments. In market treatments, they used the second price sealed bid
auction and the English clock auction to elicit selling prices. In addition to experimenting with
individual choice and market decision making, Cox and Grether included treatments with
hypothetical and real monetary payoffs of salient rewards. They also included treatments with and
without repetition of tasks. Cox and Grether reported that:
(a) The PRP is robust to hypothetical vs. monetary payoffs and to individual choice vs. market
decisions without repetition.
(b) With hypothetical payoffs the PRP is robust to individual choice vs. market decisions with
repetition.
(c) With monetary payoffs, the PRP is not robust to five rounds of market decision making.
A good question to pose for experimental economists is whether they have data that provides
clear support for their shared methodological view that subjects should be paid salient monetary
rewards. Results from this experiment provide an unambiguously clear example. The central
question for the research is whether the PRP is robust to repeated decisions in markets. With data
from hypothetical payoff treatments the answer is “yes”. With data from money payoff treatments
the answer is “no”.
Insight into the reasons why hypothetical and financial incentives had these implications is
provided by reviewing the features of the English clock auction in this experiment. Selling prices
were elicited; therefore the English clock displays decreasing prices. In the case of the money bet
with $16 win state payoff, the clock started at a price of $16 and decreased by 5 cents every second.
This means, for example, it would take 243 price clock ticks extending over 243 seconds for the
price on the clock to decrease to this money bet’s expected value of $3.85. Subject impatience or
disutility from time spent watching the price clock could be relieved by exiting the auction early
in the price decrease time period. This is exactly what many subjects did in the treatment with
hypothetical payoffs (Cox and Grether 1996). But exiting early produces high selling prices for
the dollar bet and results in high preference reversal rates. In contrast, in the treatments with
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financial incentives ($16 in the win state or $1.50 in the loss state, and 50 percent of these amounts
in another treatment), subjects remained in the auction long enough to produce selling prices
consistent with their choices.35 This example supports an interpretation that it is important to avoid
hypothetical payoffs when it is expected that subjects may get disutility from playing the game,
and to use dominant salient monetary payoffs that are sufficiently high to compensate for the
disutility. In contrast, when playing the game is valued, and accumulating hypothetical payoffs is
enjoyable, as in some double auction experiments, paying real payoffs may not be necessary.
The PRP did not disappear in Cox and Grether’s treatments that used repeated decision tasks
and real payoffs when BDM was used to elicit selling prices. The efficacy of BDM in eliciting true
buying or selling prices depends on subjects’ understanding of the mechanism, an issue we take
up next.
8. GAME FORM RECOGNITION CONFOUNDING INDUCED VALUATION
A gap between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) has been reported in
27 out of 39 experiments listed in Table 1 of Plott and Zeiler (2005). 36 The gap, however,
disappears in Plott and Zeiler (2005) who use BDM as the elicitation mechanism and whose
experimental procedure includes extensive training of subjects on the elicitation mechanism. In
light of their findings, the authors advance the idea that “subject misconception” may explain the
observed gap.37
Cason and Plott (2014) take the idea of “game misconception” one step further by studying
the performance of the BDM mechanism in elicitation of a known value. In their experiment, the
value of the object is induced (a card that can be exchanged for $2), so no “endowment” effect is
expected (see also Kahneman et al. 1990). Their data reveal a correlation between WTA and the
upper bound of the support of stochastic prices used in the BDM elicitation.
Cason and Plott argue that low cost of “mistakes” from game misunderstanding can
explain this correlation but context-dependent “preferences” cannot. Subjects, in search of clues
for understanding the new mechanism, may pool from their experience and (mistakenly) think of

The win state payoff would be about $26 in 2017 dollars. This was “real money” for undergraduate subjects.
Endowment effect and loss aversion have appeared as favorite explanations of the WTP/WTA gap.
37
For some controversy about these issues, see Isoni et al. (2011) and Plott and Zeller (2011).
35
36
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BDM as a first price (sellers’) auction.38 The “seller with the lowest ask sells the good and receives
her own ask” is a common experience whereas exposure to exchanges happening at a price
different that the seller’s ask may be limited. If so, then the optimal asking price in the presence
of such misconception is increasing in the upper bound of the support of BDM prices, which is
consistent with the Cason and Plott data. These findings call for caution in interpreting data from
experiments with possible game misconception as revealing non-standard preferences. Increasing
the scale of payoffs is expected to fail in ameliorating this type of loss of control for subjects who
are not aware of their own misconception and who experience little or no opportunity cost from
their actions.
Almost half (17 out of 39) of the experiments from the literature on the gap of WTA/WTP
reviewed by Plott and Zeiler 2005 (Table 1) did not use an incentive compatible mechanism in
elicitation of valuations. The use of payoff protocols that are not incentive compatible is a common
but puzzling practice by many researchers.
9. HOW NOT TO MISUSE INDUCED VALUATION: INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PAYOFF
MECHANISMS
A payoff protocol that provides a mapping from a sequence of choices to realized payment is
incentive incompatible if it provides incentives for a subject, who prefers option a over b in a
single decision, to prefer b over a when the choice is embedded in a multiple decision setting. Use
of incentive incompatible payoff protocols is widespread in the literature, most especially in
experiments on decisions under risk but also in many other topic areas (Cox et al. 2015).
The experiment on the preference reversal phenomenon by Grether and Plott (1979)
generated methodological critiques that have not been generally appreciated more than three
decades later. Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) stated “…this behavior is not simply a violation of
some type of expected utility hypothesis… It suggests that no optimization principles of any sort
lie behind even the simplest of human choices …”. Such claims of generality elicited critiques by
Holt (1986) and Karni and Safra (1987).

38

Authors identify 111 (out of 244) subjects whose choices suggest this type of misconception.
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Karni and Safra (1987) explained that the BDM mechanism used by Grether and Plott to
elicit selling prices for the binary lottery options in the experiment requires reduction and
independence axioms to interpret data as preference reversals.
Grether and Plott asked their subjects to make several decisions and randomly selected one
decision for payoff. They did this to control for portfolio effects from realizing payoffs from more
than one decision at the end of the experiment and for wealth effects from paying each decision
immediately after it was made.39 Their random selection payoff protocol has been given several
names in the literature; perhaps the most commonly used name is random lottery incentive
mechanism (RLIM). Holt (1986) explained that RLIM depends on the reduction and independence
axioms from expected utility theory for interpretation of the data as preference reversals. The
reasoning is as follows. The choice options in the experiment are binary lotteries. Randomly
selecting one decision for payoff is itself a lottery. Hence the incentives provided to the subjects
are compound lotteries consisting of the payoff mechanism “wrapped around” the binary lottery
options in the experiment. Interpretation of the data as revealing preferences over the binary
lotteries themselves, rather than preferences over the compound lottery used to incentivize the
subjects, depends on the reduction and independence axioms; without these axioms, there is no
theoretical basis for identifying a subject’s responses as revealing her true preferences over the
binary lotteries in the experiment.40
The critique by Holt (1986) created a problem for experimental methods intended to test
theories of decision making under risk other than expected utility theory. Absent known incentive
To illustrate “portfolio” and “wealth” effects consider two pairs of lotteries {a,b} and {c,d}. Let the Experimental
Decision Problem be ranking of lotteries in each pair. The experimenter asks the subject to choose between a and b
and also choose between d and c. Portfolio Effect: Suppose that the experimenter pays the independently realized
outcome from each chosen lottery at the end of the experiment. In that case, the Subject’s Decision Problem is to
choose the most preferred out of the four available portfolios of two lotteries: [a,c], [a,d], [b,c] or [b,d]. The
Experimental and Subject’s Decision Problems are not the same. For example, if {a,b} and {c,d} are the same pair
then an EU individual with power 0.5 utility function prefers option a (30 for sure) over option b (100 or 0 with even
odds) but he prefers portfolio [b,b] if he is asked to choose from {a,b} twice. Wealth Effect: Now suppose that the
experimenter realizes the payoff from the first chosen lottery in pair {a,b} right after the choice is made. If the outcome
is some x then when the subject chooses again her choice set is {x+c, x+d} and therefore, the Experimental and
Subject’s Decision Problems are not the same. This is known in the literature as “wealth effect”. Using the example
utility above, the subject chooses b the first time. If the outcome is 100 then the second time he chooses b again but if
the outcome is 0 then he chooses a.
39

Cox et al. (2015) offer counterexamples to incentive compatibility of RLIM in absence of the independence axiom.
Some wording in Azrieli et al. (2017) might suggest to readers that RLIM (or RPS in their terms) is incentive
compatible for decision theories other than expected utility theory. But their “Fact 1.1” (Azrieli et al. 2017, p. 16)
makes clear their agreement with earlier work that the independence axiom is required, given reduction of compound
lotteries.
40
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compatible payoff protocols, much literature over the subsequent three decades simply ignores
Holt’s critique and applies RLIM in experiments intended to test alternatives to EUT such as rank
dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect theory. Serious problems with this approach are
provided by counterexamples to incentive compatibility of RLIM in absence of the independence
axiom (Holt 1986, Cox et al. 2015) and empirical data demonstrating that the bias introduced by
this payoff mechanism is significant (Cox et al. 2014, 2015; Harrison and Swarthout 2014).
As first asserted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), a common justification for using RLIM
in absence of the independence axiom is the empirical assertion that subjects isolate each choice
independently of the other choice opportunities in an experiment. This assertion is appealing to
experimentalists because it simplifies experimental design: it allows one to ignore complications
in interpreting data that come from possible cross-task contamination in many-decision
experiments. There have been some papers that report isolation is supported by experimental data.
Starmer and Sugden (1991) and Hey and Li (2005a) consider the two extreme hypotheses that
subjects: (1) isolate each choice; or (2) make all choices so as to yield the most preferred
probability distribution of payoffs from the whole experiment (which they named “full reduction”).
They conclude that full reduction can be rejected in favor of isolation. Hey and Li (2005b) test
isolation against a hypothesis of “partial reduction” in which the current decision task can be given
higher or lower weight than preceding tasks when a subject makes decisions so as to choose the
best probability distribution for the whole experiment. The problem with this approach is that there
are many alternatives to isolation other than full or partial reduction, including the more plausible
hypothesis of cross-task contamination between choices.41
Recent empirical tests have produced consistent evidence of cross-task contamination from
RLIM. Cox et al. (2014) report that asymmetrically dominated options can be introduced into sets
of choice options in ways that permit systematic manipulation of subjects’ choices when they are
paid with RLIM.42 Cox et al. (2015) report additional tests for cross-task contamination by three
versions of RLIM and find that their RLIM data are characterized by significant choice order

Starmer and Sugden (1991, p. 977) report one test for cross-task contamination in which the two-sided p-value is
0.051.
42
Let the choice set, S1 be a pair of options {A, B}. Construct a new choice set, S2 = {C, D} such that A dominates C
but D dominates B. Choosing from S2 first increases attractiveness of A in a subsequent choice from S1. In one
treatment in Cox et al. (2014), A and C were safe options with payments 4 € and 3 € whereas B and D were even-odds
risky lotteries with prizes 0 or, resp., 10 € and 12 €. Option B was chosen by 83% of subjects in a single decision task
(S1) whereas in the two decision tasks (first S2, then S1) only 52% of subjects chose B.
41
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effects on revelation of classical paradoxical patterns. Harrison and Swarthout (2014) report an
experiment in which a treatment with a single decision is used to generate control data for use in
econometric analysis of risk attitudes with data generated by a treatment with many decisions and
use of RLIM to select one decision for payoff. They find that estimated probability weighting for
RDU is biased by data generated with RLIM.
Methodological problems with use of incentive incompatible payoff protocols are not
confined to experiments on theories of decision under risk; instead, as explained by Cox et al.
(2015), these problems are present in many other topic areas including research on social
preferences, bargaining, public goods, and voting. The continuing problem with use of incentive
incompatible payoff protocols apparently stems, in part, from paucity of payoff protocols (for use
in multiple decision experiments) that do not require the independence axiom. Partial solutions to
this problem are beginning to be discovered.
Cox et al. (2015) report theoretical and empirical properties of a new payoff protocol – pay
all correlated (PAC) – that is incentive compatible for the dual theory of expected utility (Yaari,
1987).43 Li (2016) introduced the accumulative best choice (ABC) mechanism that is incentive
compatible for general risk theories, regardless of whether they include the independence axiom,
which can be used in some types of applications.44 Li finds that ABC is also behaviorally incentive
compatible for her data.
Summary Implications: Assuming that the researcher wants to use payoff protocols that are
incentive compatible − in other words that he or she wants to avoid using payoff protocols that
create incentives for biased choices − then he or she should observe the following principles of
experimental methods:45
1. For risk neutral models, all commonly used methods of paying subjects are incentive
compatible.

With the pay all correlated mechanism, outcomes from all chosen lotteries are paid for one realization of the state
of nature at the end of the experiment. For this mechanism, states of nature need to be defined and all lotteries arranged
to be comonotonic. That is, let states be indexed by s (= 1,…,m) and lotteries by i (=1,…,n). If we let πis denote the
payoff from lottery i in state s then πis ≥ πis+1 for all states s and all lotteries i.
44
With the accumulated best choice mechanisms, the chosen option in decision round k is one of the feasible options
in round k+1. The subject is paid according to the option chosen in the final round.
45
We end this section with these summary statements because widely read journals continue to publish papers
reporting experiments with unknown bias in data from use of payoff mechanisms known to be incentive incompatible.
Cox et al. (2015) contains examples from papers in multiple journals on a range of topic areas.
43
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2. Independently realizing outcomes for more than one decision at the end of an experiment
creates portfolio incentives for risk averse agents.
3. Randomly selecting one decision for payoff is not incentive compatible unless the
independence axiom is assumed.
4. Paying all decisions sequentially is incentive compatible for decision theories defined over
income, not accumulated wealth.
5. For comonotonic options, paying all choices at the end of the experiment with one
realization of the state of nature (PAC) is incentive compatible for the dual theory of
expected utility.
6. Giving each subject only one decision task is incentive compatible for all decision theories.
7. The accumulated best choice (ABC) mechanism is incentive compatible for decision
theories with complete and transitive preferences.

10. Concluding Remarks
Incentives are a major part of what defines the “economics” part in experimental economics. We
have discussed several experimental approaches to addressing confounds identified in the
literature. They include: choice of salient payoff levels to insure dominance, experience (practice
rounds, repetition) to promote understanding of decision tasks and unfamiliar institutions,
withholding information on others’ payoffs (privacy) to deter interpersonal preferences (when
appropriate), alternative institutional formats (e.g. game trees and price clocks) to vary
accessibility of payoff information; and lottery payoffs to induce risk neutrality. We have
examined issues that arise with response mode effects and game form misconception. Choice of
which instruments to use and when to use them is part of the art of experimental design that should
be informed by the research questions of interest and the type of confounds that are expected in a
given environment and economic institution. One confound that is frequently not addressed in the
literature is use of payoff protocols that are not incentive compatible. We call attention to this
issue.
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